UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-8-2008

Vavold v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 35339

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Vavold v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 35339" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2122.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2122

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JERRYE. VAVOLD,
SUPREME COURT NO. 35339
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District
of the State of!daho, in and for the County of Nez Perce

Honorable JeffM. Brudie
District Judge Presiding

Lawrence Wasden
Idaho Attorney General's Office
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400

Teresa A Hampton
HAMPTON & ELLIOTT
912 N. 8 th Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 384-5456

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

I. Table of Contents
I.

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................... 1

II.

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ........................................................................ 2

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................ 4
A.

NATUREOFTHECASE .......................................................................................................... 4
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS .................................................................................................... 4
STATEMENTOFFACTS ......................................................................................................... 5

B.
C.

IV. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................................... 6
V.

ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................... 6
STANDARD OF REVIEW ........................................................................................................ 6
RETROACTIVE APPLICA TiON Of ESTRADA IS WARRANTED .................................................. 6

A.

B.

I.
2.

Federal Retroactive Application ................................. ................................................... 7
State Retroactive Application. ...................................................................................... 17

VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 20

II. Table of Cases and Authorities
Cases
Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565 (9 th Cir. l 982) ................................................................. 15
Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004) ................................................................................. 7, 10, 17
Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, (I 987) ................................................................................. 13
Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 127 L. Ed. 2d 236, 114 S. Ct. 948 (1994) ........................... 8, 10
Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S.Ct.1029 (2008) .............................................................................. 17
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) .................................................................................. 19
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 68 L. Ed. 359 (1981) ...................................... 12, 15
Estradav. State,143 Idaho 558,149 P.3d 833 (2007) .................................................... 4, 9, II, 12
Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 825 P.2d 1073 (1991) ................................................................. 6
Gay v. County Commissioners of Bonneville County, I 03 Idaho 626, 651 P .2d 560 (Idaho 1982)
................................................................................................................................................... 19
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ...................................................................... 9, 17, 19
Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333,364, 124 L. Ed. 2d 306,113 S. Ct.2112 (1993) ..................... 17
Glock v. Singletary, 65 F.3d 878, 884 (11th Cir. I 995) ................................................................ 16
Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F. 3d 523 (9 th Cir. 2001) ...................................................................... 15, 16
Howardv. United States, 374 F.3d 1068 (!Ith Cir. 2004) ....................................................... 7, 17
Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 570 P.2d 284 (I 977) ................................................................... 18
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997) ............................................................................. 7, I 0
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) .................................................................................... 18
Mackeyv. UnitedStates,401 U.S.667(1971) ................................................................................. 9
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992) .................................................................................... 13
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990) ...................................................................................... 13
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) ..................................................................................... 13
Plath v. South Carolina, 467 U.S. 1265 (I 984) .............................................................................. 13
Quinlan v. Idaho Commission on Pardons and Parole, 138 Idaho 726 (2003) ............................. 6
Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792 (Ct. App. 1994) ......................................................................... 11
Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 865 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1993) ........................................................ 6
Rothgery v. Gillispie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008) ..................................................................... 13
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (I 990) ................................................................................................ 7
Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988) ..................................................................................... 13
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) ................................................................................ 9, 16
Spaziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028 (11th Cir. 1994) ................................................................. 16
State v. Alexander, 125 Wn.2d 717, 888 P.2d l 169 (1995) ............................................................ 14
State v. Bandura, 85 Wn. App. 87 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) ............................................................. 14
State v. King (In re King), 130 Wn.2d 517, 925 P.2d 606 (1999) ................................................... 14
State v. Ruth, I 02 Idaho 63 8 (1981) .............................................................................................. 11
State v. Strauss, 93 Wn. App. 691,969 P. 2d 529 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) ...................................... 14
State v. Tinkham, 74 Wn. App. 102,871 P. 2d 1127 (Wash. Ct.App. 1994) ............................. 12, 14
State v. Whitman, 96 ldaho 489,531 P.2d 579 (1975) ................................................................. 18
Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d 441 (7 th Cir. 1992) ............................................................................. 7
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) ................................................................................. 7, 8, 9, 17
Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523P.2d 1365 (1974) ............................................................ 18
United States v. Benlian, 63 F.3d 824 (9° 1 Cir. 1995) ..................................................................... 12
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984) .............................................................................. 13
2

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) ................................................................................... 12
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 127 S. Ct. 1180 (2007) ......................................................... 8, 9
Statutes

Idaho Code §18-1508 .................................................................................................................. 2, 3
Idaho Code §18-8316 ....................................................................................................................... 9

3

III. Statement of the Case
A. Nature of the Case
Mr. Vavold filed a petition for post-conviction relief seeking a new sentencing hearing
based npon ineffective assistance of counsel and denial of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
He seeks relief under the rule announced in Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2007),
that a court-ordered psychosexual evaluation is a critical stage of the criminal proceedings to
which the right to counsel attaches.
Mr. Vavold seeks retroactive application of the rule announced in the Estrada decision.

B. Course of Proceedings
Mr. Vavold entered a guilty plea to one count of Lewd and Lascivious Conduct with a
Minor in violation of Idaho Code § 18-1508. CR 12. He was sentenced on November 17, 1999
to a term of five years determinate and 15 years indeterminate. CR 12. Mr. Vavold sought, but
was denied, relief under Idaho Criminal Rule 35. He appealed the denial of the Rule 35. CR 12.
The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the decision denying relief on October 27, 2000. CR 12.
Mr. Vavold did not petition the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
On January 22, 2007, the Idaho Supreme Court announced its decision in Estrada, 143
Idaho 558. Mr. Vavold filed a prose petition for post-conviction relief on November 21, 2007.
CR 7. He asserted he was denied the constitutional protections announced in Estrada and was
provided ineffective assistance of counsel. CR 3 - 5. He requested an evidentiary hearing, but
that request was effectively denied by the district court's summary dismissal. CR 5, 1.
The State sought summary dismissal on two grounds: untimeliness and lack of factual
support. Counsel for Mr. Vavold entered an appearance and responded to the State's motion for
4

summary dismissal. In response, Mr. Vavold asserted the Estrada decision announced a new
rule of law which should be retroactively applied. Oral argument was taken on the motion.
The district court denied relief on the petition finding the petition was not timely filed
and Estrada did not apply retroactively to the petition. CR 35, 44. The district court did not
make any factual findings with respect to the petition's factual allegations. Mr. Vavold timely
appealed the decision to this Court. CR 51.

C. Statement of"Facts
The entry of the guilty plea and the participation in the psychosexual evaluation occurred
in 1999 and 2000. CR. 27, 14. After entering a guilty plea to a violation ofldaho Code§ 181508, Mr. Vavold was ordered to participate in a psychosexual evaluation prior to the sentencing
hearing. CR 28. At the evaluation, Mr. Vavold's request for counsel was denied and he was
denied an opportunity to consult with counsel. CR 8. Because of the denial of counsel, Mr.
Vavold was also deprived of his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination, his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
Sixth Amendment based upon counsel's failure to advise Mr. Vavold of the consequences of
submitting to the court-ordered evaluation and the potential waiver of his Fifth Amendment
privilege. CR 5.
At the sentencing, the district court stated it had carefully reviewed the psychosexual
evaluation. The district court found the psychosexual evaluation indicated a risk of future
criminal conduct and that despite the court's belief that Mr. Vavold would "do well on a retained
jurisdiction" his was not an appropriate case for the program. CR 25. The court sentenced Mr.
Vavold to five years determinate and 15 years indeterminate. CR 12.
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IV. Issue Presented on Appeal
The issue before this Court is whether Estrada announced a new rnle oflaw when it held
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached to a court-ordered psychosexual evaluation.

V. Argument
A. Standard of Review
This Court exercises free review of conclusions of law regarding retroactive application
of this Court's decision by the district court. Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 825 P.2d 1073,
1074 (1991). Constitutional issues are pure questions oflaw over which the appellate courts
exercise free review. Quinlan v. Idaho Commission on Pardons and Parole, 138 Idaho 726, 729,
69 P.2d 146, 149 (2003).
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary
hearing, the appellate court determines whether a genuine issue of fact existed based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file. The court liberally
construes the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Ricca v. State, 124
Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993).

B. Retroactive Application of Estrada is Warranted
The retroactive application of rules of law can be analyzed under the federal retroactivity
doctrine and the Idaho's retroactivity doctrine. Mr. Vavold asserts that under either analysis,
Estrada applies retroactively to his case.

6

1. Federal Retroactive Application

A case which announces a new rule may retroactively apply in certain circumstances. In
order to determine whether federal retroactivity principles dictate application to cases on
collateral review, a court must determine that ( l) the case announces a new rule, and if so, then
(2) determine whether the new rule falls into one of two established categories rendering
application to collateral cases.
The first question in federal retroactivity analysis is whether a case announces a new rule.
This entails a three step process. First, the comt determines the date the defendant's conviction
became final. Second, from that date, the court ascertains the "legal landscape." Beard v. Banks,
542 U.S. 406,411 (2004). Third, the court determines whether a court would have felt
compelled by existing precedent to conclude the rule was required by the Constitution. Lambrix
v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527 ( 1997).
"[T)he 'new rule' rule is easier to recite than apply in most cases." Taylor v. Gilmore,
954 F.2d 441, 445

(7' 11 Cir.

1992). It is admittedly difficult to determine when a case announces a

new rule of law. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (plurality decision). A new rule of law
is one that breaks new ground or imposes new obligations upon the States and federal government.
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 30 l. It is a rule not dictated by the precedent existing at the time of the

conviction. Sqffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484,488 (1990), Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 301 (emphasis
added). A result is not dictated if the outcome was susceptible to debate among reasonable
jurists. Howard v. United States, 374 F.3d I 068, l 074 (11th Cir. 2004).
Courts look to the legal landscape existing at the time of conviction. Evaluating state
court proceedings at that point in time promotes the fundamental purpose of habeas review: that
state courts conduct criminal proceedings in accordance with constitutional standards prevalent
at the time the original proceeding took place. Sajjle v. Parks, 494 U.S. at 488 (internal citations
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omitted). After fixing the date of conviction, determining the state of the law requires review of
cases announced prior to the date of final conviction for the constitutional standard at issue.

Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383,391, 127 L.Ed. 2d 236,114 S.Ct. 948 (1994).

If the court determines that the case announces a "new rule" the court still must
determine whether application to cases on collateral review is appropriate. Typically, a new rule
applies to cases pending on direct appeal. New rules are not applied to cases in which a conviction
was final before the rule was announced. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 311.
Habeas corpus always has been a collateral remedy, providing an avenue for upsetting
judgments that have become otherwise final. It is not designed as a substitute for direct
review. The interest in leaving concluded litigation in a state of repose, that is, reducing
the controversy to a final judgment not subject to further judicial revision, may quite
legitimately be found by those responsible for defining the scope of the writ to outweigh
in some, many, or most instances the competing interest in readjudicating convictions
according to all legal standards in effect when a habeas petition is filed.

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 306 (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682-3 (1971)).
There are two exceptions to the non-retroactive application of new rules: (1) the rule
announces a substantive rule of criminal law, that is a change in constitutional interpretation that
places certain private conduct beyond the power of the state's authority to proscribe, e. g. Griswold

v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 ( 1965); or (2) the rule is a "watershed rule of criminal procedure
implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Whorton v.

Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 127 S. Ct. 1173, l 180 (2007). Estrada represents a watershed rule of
criminal procedure.
A rule of criminal procedure encompasses "those procedures that are implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty." Teague at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan
concurring)). As explained by Justice Harlan, these rules of criminal procedure are the elements of
an adjudicatory process that include the "bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate
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the fairness of a particular conviction." Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S.667, 693 (1971) (Harlan
concurring). "For example, such ... is the case with the right to counsel at trial now held a
necessary condition precedent to any conviction for a serious crime [under Gideon v.
Wainwright] .... Hence, (Justice Harlan] would continue to apply Gideon itself on habeas, even to
convictions made final before that decision was rendered." Id. at 694. As explained by the Supreme
Court in Teague, a procedural rule in this context refers to rules which protect procedural due
process. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 306 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. at
692)(Harlan concmTing)). In this case, the application of the right to counsel at court-ordered
evaluations is the type of procedural due process rule implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
encompassed by Mackey and Teague.
A new rule rising to the stature of a "watershed rule" is a narrow exception to the nonretroactive application of new rules. A new rule must prevent an impermissibly large risk of
inaccurate conviction or sentence and must alter the understanding of the bedrock procedural
elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding before a court will deem it a "watershed rule" of
criminal procedure. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. at I 182; Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348,
357 (2004).

It is well settled that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is applicable to the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The right to
counsel attaches at all critical stages of the criminal prosecution. "[I]fthe stage is not critical,
there can be no constitutional violation, no matter how deficient counsel's performance." Estrada,
143 Idaho at 562 (internal citations omitted). The right encompasses the right to effective
assistance of counsel.
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While the general principle of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel at critical stages of
prosecution and the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is well established, Estrada
breaks new ground. In Estrada, the Idaho Supreme Court found that a court-ordered evaluation
in a non-capital case was a "critical stage" for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel. Mr. Vavold asserts the Estrada decision announced a new rule of law that amounts to a
watershed rule of criminal procedure and it should be retroactively applied.

Estrada announces a new and watershed rule of criminal procedure
Estrada clearly announced a new rule of criminal procedure. Applying the three-step
process to the Estrada decision, the first step is to determine when Mr. Vavold's conviction became
final. State convictions are final "for purposes of retroactivity analysis when the availability of
direct appeal to the state courts has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ of
certiorari has elapsed or a timely filed petition has been finally denied." Caspari v. Bohlen, 510
at 390). In this case, Mr. Vavold's conviction was final once the time for petition for certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court from the decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals expired. Thus,
his conviction became final on January 25, 2001; 90 days from November 24, 2000. Rules of the
United States Supreme Court, Rule 13.
The second step is to look at "the legal landscape" as it existed on January 25, 2001, and
ultimately determine whether that landscape dictated the result of Estrada. Beard v. Banks, 542
U.S. at 413, Lambrix v. Single!ary, 520 U.S. at 527 - 8. That is, could reasonable jurists differ as
to whether the then existing precedent compelled the result that a court-ordered psychosexual
evaluation in a noncapital case was a critical stage of the criminal proceedings? Beardv. Banks,
542 U.S. at 414. The clear answer is "no" - the legal landscape existing in 2001 indicates

Estrada is a new rule of law.
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The analysis of whether a court-ordered psychosexual evaluation had been defined as a
critical stage at the time of Mr. Vavold's conviction starts with the Estrada decision itself. When
Estrada's appeal was initial! y presented to the Idaho Court of Appeals, that Court found no Idaho
appellate or United States Supreme Court decision had held an evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code

§18-8316 in a non-capital case was a critical stage of the proceedings entitling a defendant to the
advice of counsel regarding participation in the evaluation. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562. The

Estrada Court likewise did not rely upon any Idaho case standing for the proposition that a
psychosexual evaluation is a critical stage to which the Sixth Amendment attaches. Ibid.
The cases relied upon by the Estrada court dealt with the application of the Sixth
Amendment to factual situations other than a court-ordered psychosexual evaluation in a non-capital
case. Estrada, l 43 Idaho at 562 (citing State v. Ruth, l 02 Idaho 638 (l 98 l), Retamoza v. State, 125
Idaho 792, 796 (Ct. App. 1994), United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967), United States v.

Benlian, 63 F.3d 824, 827 (9 th Cir. 1995)).
In State v. Ruth the Court found the right to counsel attached at the time of the initial
appearance. The issue before the Ruth court was whether an accused could waive counsel's
presence without notifying defense counsel of the waiver. The case did not raise, and the opinion
did not discuss, the right to counsel extending to an evaluation. State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638 (1981).
In Retamoza v. State, the Court of Appeals outlined the basic premise that the right to
counsel attaches to critical stages, including the decision to plead guilty and the sentencing phase.
The issue before the court was whether counsel is ineffective for failing to pursue a judicial
recommendation against depo11ation. Depo1tation, according to the court, was a collateral
consequence and not one which must be revealed by counsel as a duty nnder the Sixth Amendment.

Retamoza v. Slate, 125 Idaho 792, 796 (Ct. App. 1994).

11

Similarly, the federal cases cited in Estrada provide the general state of the law as to the
right to counsel attaching at critical stages. None address the interplay between the right to counsel
and a court-ordered evaluation. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (right to
counsel at lineups); United States v. Ben/ian, 63 F.3d 824, 827 (9°' Cir. 1995) (presentence
investigation not a critical stage subject to right to counsel).
From this review of the case law, the Estrada Court stated "[i]t makes no sense that a
defendant would be entitled to counsel up through conviction or entry of a guilty plea, and would
also be entitled to representation at sentencing, yet would not be entitled to the advice of counsel in
the interim period regarding a psychosexual evaluation." Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562. The Court
cited two cases in support of this insight, Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 68 L. Ed.
359(198l)andStatev. Tinkham, 74 Wn. App. 102,871 P.2d 1127 (Wash. Ct.App.1994). Based
upon Estelle and Tinkham, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded "that a Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel in the critical stage of a psychosexual evaluation" existed. Estrada, 143 Idaho
at 562.
The Estrada Court found Estelle v. Smith "instructive" when determining whether the
psychosexual evaluation was a critical stage. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562. Estelle, as acknowledged
by the Estrada court was a capital case in which the United States Supreme Court found the right to
counsel attached to a psychiatric evaluation. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562. Expanding Estelle's reach
to non-capital cases presents a significant break with the jurisprudence applying Estelle and one not
compelled by Estelle's holding.

In determining the broader legal landscape applicable to Mr. Vavold, certainly Estelle looms
large in the landscape when determining whether a psychosexual evaluation is a critical stage.
While instructive to the analysis in a non-capital case, Estelle is limited to capital cases by its facts.
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Its subsequent application by the United States Supreme Court has also limited it to capital cases.
No United States Supreme Court decision applied Estelle's right to counsel at a psychiatric
evaluation to a non-capital case at the time of Mr. Vavold's sentencing and at the time his
conviction became final. Sec United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984) (non-capital
murder, right to counsel attaches at initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings), Plath v. South

Carolina, 467 U.S. 1265 (1984) (capital case,jury view is critical stage), Michigan v. Jackson, 475
U.S. 625,630 (1986) (non-capital case, post-arraignment interrogation critical stage), Buchanan v.

Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402,422 (1987) (non-capital case, Estelle not applicable to non-capital case
when defendant asserts insanity defense and requests psychiatric evaluation), Satterwhite v. Texas,
486 U.S. 249, 253 (1988) (capital case, harmless error rnle applies to Sixth Amendment violation at
psychiatric evaluation), Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 346 (1990) (non-capital case, statements
made in response to police-initiated inquiries in violation of Sixth Amendment right may be used to
impeach defendant) and Medina v. California, SOS U.S. 437,450 (l 992) (capital case, burden of
proof on issue of competency may be placed on defendant).
Since 2001, no United States Supreme Court decision has extended Estelle's application to
an evaluation in a non-capital case. The most recent United States Supreme Court case citing

Estelle was limited to the proposition that right to counsel in non-capital cases attaches at initiation
of adversarial proceedings. Rothgery v. Gillispie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2593 (2008) (concurring
opinion). Based upon the application of Es·telle through 200 J and its language, the result of Estrada
would be susceptible to debate among reasonable minds in January of 200 l.
The only case cited by the Estrada court for the proposition that a non-capital case
evaluation was of the same tenor as the evaluation in the Estelle capital case was State v. Tinkham,
74 Wn. App. l 02, 871 P. 2d 1127 (Wash. Ct.App. 1994). Tinkham does hold that the Sixth
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Amendment attaches to court-order evaluations in non-capital cases. However, Tinkham is the only
case found by counsel to so hold.
Further, the analysis of the issue as provided by the Washington court does little to support
the extension of Estelle's Sixth Amendment determination of a critical stage. The Washington
Court of Appeals made no reference to the distinction between a capital and non-capital case in
Tinkham. "A court ordered psychological exam to determine a defendant's future dangerousness
for sentencing purposes is a critical stage requiring the assistance of counsel. Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. at 470 (defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel clearly attached when
psychiatrist examined him at jail, and their interview proved to be "critical stage")." State v.
Tinkham, 74 Wn. App. at l l 0, 871 P.2d at 113 J. No analysis or explanation for the departure
from the legal landscape of limiting Estelle to capital cases was offered by the Washington court.
Tinkham would not lead a reasonable jurist to conclude in 200 l that the result, a non-capital
psychosexual evaluation was a critical stage, was dictated.
The cases citing to Tinkham from 1994 until 200 I are limited to the general proposition that
the Fifth Amendment applies to critical stages of criminal prosecution. The cases do not discuss the
attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to psychological evaluations in non-capital
cases. See State v. Bandura, 85 Wn. App. 87 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997), State v. Strauss, 93 Wn. App.
691, 969 P. 2d 529 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (postconviction silence is protected where testimony may
result in greater punishment), State v. Alexander, 125 Wn.2d 717,888 P.2d 1169 (1995) (cited for
another proposition umclated to Sixth Amendment).
In State v. King (In re King), 130 Wn.2d 517, 925 P.2d 606 (1999), another case relying
upon Tinkham, the petitioner alleged the use of disclosures in a court-ordered sexual psychopathy
treatment program violated the Fifth Amendment. The Washington court did not discuss the
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application of the Sixth Amendment to that situation. Given the narrow interpretation of Tinkham
by the Washington state courts at the time of Mr. Vavold's conviction, Tinkham, standing alone,
does not compel the result of the Estrada decision. When Tinkham is viewed as part of the legal
landscape at the time of Mr. Vavold's conviction, its persuasive value is significantly reduced,
especially in light of Estelle and its limited application to capital cases.
The distinction between applying Estelle in capital and non-capital cases is underscored by

Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565 (9 111 Cir. 1982). Baumann involved a non-capital
sentencing case. The Ninth Circuit evaluated whether Estelle's holding of a Sixth Amendment right
to counsel should be extended to all segments of the sentencing phase and in particular to a
presentence interview. Baumann, 692 F.2d at 577. The comt found that the presentence
investigation interview was not a critical stage of the criminal proceedings and declined to extend
the reach of the Sixth Amendment to this segment. !bid at 578.
To emphasize that the Baumann cou1t distinguished between capital and non-capital cases,
the Ninth Circuit revisited the issue of critical stage as it applied to presentence investigations in

Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F. 3d 523 (91h Cir. 2001) (released January 3, 2001). The Court found that a
presentence interview in a capital case was a "critical stage" for the purposes of the Sixth
Amendment. !loffinan v. Arave, 236 F.3d at 540. The Court rejected the state's argument that

Baumann controlled on the issue of a capital case. Hofjinan confirms that Estelle's application to
post-verdict, pre-sentence evaluations was limited to capital cases in January 2001.
The legal landscape at the time of Mr. Vavold's sentencing did not compel the decision in

Estrada. The right to counsel at a psychological evaluation had only been established in capital
cases at the time of Mr. Vavold's sentencing. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454. That right had not
been extended to non-capital cases.
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A result is not dictated by precedent just because "the result the habeas petitioner seeks is
within the logical compass of a prior Supreme Court decision" or because "prior Supreme Court
decisions inform, or even control or govern, the analysis of the claim." Spaziano v. Singletary, 36
F.3d 1028, 1042 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted). For these purposes,
a result is dictated by precedent only if the court considering the claim at the time the conviction
became final "would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [the
defendant] seeks was required by the Constitution." Glock v. Singletary, 65 F.3d 878, (11th Cir.
1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is not a dictated result if the case's outcome was
"susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." Ibid.
Estelle's analytical framework had been limited to capital cases by the United States Court

of Appeals at the time of Mr. Vavold's conviction. Hojfinan v. Arave, 236 F.3d at 540. Thus
Estrada announced a new watershed rule that should be retroactively applied to Mr. Vavold.
Estrada announced a watershed rule of criminal procedure

While the United States Supreme Court has rarely applied new rules retroactively, Schriro v.
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, the clear exception is the Sixth Amendment's guaranty of the right to

counsel.
Every extension of the right to counsel from Gideon through Argersinger has
been applied retroactively to collateral proceedings by the [United States]
Supreme Court. The holding of Gideon itself, which established the right to
counsel in all felony convictions, 372 U.S. at 344-45, 83 S. Ct. at 796-97, was
judged to be retroactively applicable in Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847, 847,
91 S. Ct. 1089, 1090, 28 L. Ed. 2d 519 (1971). The right to counsel at plea
hearings, recognized in White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S. Ct. 1050, 10 L.
Ed. 2d l 93 (1963), was held to be retroactively applicable in Arsenault v.
Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 6, 89 S. Ct. 35, 36, 21 L. Ed. 2d 5 (1968). The right
to counsel at probation revocation hearings, announced in Mempa v. Rhay, 389
U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct. 254, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967), was held to be retroactively
applicable in McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 3-4, 89 S. Ct. 32, 33-34, 21 L.
Ed. 2d 2 (l 968). The right to counsel on appeal, recognized in Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1963), has also been
16

retroactively applied. See McConnell, 393 U.S. at 3, 89 S. Ct. at 33. Finally,
Argersinger's extension of the right to counsel to any prosecution leading to
actual imprisonment was deemed retroactively applicable in Berry v. City of
Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 29, 29-30, 94 S. Ct. 193,194, 38 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1973) A
score that is perfect packs punch in any analysis.

Howard v. United States. 374 F.3d at I 078 (discussion of watershed rules).
In providing guidance to what might fall within this watershed rule exception, the
Supreme Court has "repeatedly referred to the rule of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L.
Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963) (right to counsel), and only to this rule. See, e.g., Sajjle, supra,
at 495, 108 L. Ed. 2d 415,110 S. Ct. 1257; cf. Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333,124 L. Ed. 2d
306, 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)." Beard v. Banks, 542 US at 417. The
right to counsel at critical stages in criminal proceedings has been the only area in which the
retroactive application of a new rule of law has consistently been applied. The Estrada decision
falls within the scope of this consistently applied watershed rule.

2. State Retroactive Application.
The United States Supreme Court held that federal retroactivity doctrine, initially set out
in Teague v. Lane, 489 lJ .S. 288, "limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an
individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state court,
when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for a violation that is
deemed 'nonretroactive' under Teague." Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S.Ct.1029, 1042 (2008).
This decision allows states to determine, independent of Teague, whether Estrada should be
retroactively applied. Mr. Vavold asse1is that under Idaho's doctrine ofretroactive application
of a new rule, he is also entitled to relief.
This Court first addressed the question of retroactivity in a civil case, finding that a
statute relating to "a host's liability in a negligently caused accident" was unconstitutional.
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Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19. 24, 523 P.2d 1365, I 370 (I 974). In Thompson, this Court

identified three approaches to retroactivity. To determine which approach to apply in a given
case, this Court adopted the United States Supreme Court's rationale in Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965). Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho at 25,523 P.2d at 1371. The following year,
this Court applied the Link/etter factors in a criminal context, establishing the approach to be
taken in determining whether or not a decision is to be retroactively applied. State v. Whitman,
96 Idaho 489, 53 l P.2d 579 (l 975).

"The Court must weigh: (I) The purpose of the new rule; (2) Reliance on the prior
decisions of this Court; and (3) The effect of the new rule on the administration ofjustice."State
v. Whitman, 96 ldaho at 491,531 P.2d at 581 (footnote omitted). The "first factor [is balanced]

against the other two to determine whether to limit the retroactive application of the decision."
Jones v. Watson, 98 ldaho 606, 570 P.2d 284 (1977).

Until Danforfh, the sole exception to this Court's use of the three factor test to determine
the retroactive effect of a new rule was where a rule required by the federal constitution
announced in a United States Supreme Court decision was at issue. When such rules have been
at issue, the Court consistently applied federal retroactivity doctrine. Otherwise, the Court has
applied the test set forth in Whilman.
Applying Idaho's retroactivity test to Mr. Vavold's case shows that Estrada should be
given retroactive effect. The aim of this "purpose of the decision" factor is to assess the extent to
which the decision's purpose "would be served by applying the case to both past and future
actions." Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho at 25, 523 P.2d at 1371. Put alternatively, the aim is to
assess the extent to which the failure to apply a decision retroactively "would ... thwart[]" its
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purpose. Gay v. County Commissioners of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 631, 651 P .2d
560, 565 (Idaho 1982).
The narrow holding of Estrada is that, as a matter of Sixth Amendment law, the right to
counsel attaches in a non-capital case where the court orders a defendant to participate in a
psychosexual evaluation. This definition of the evaluation as a critical stage then provides
defendants with the right to counsel, a right seen as "an obvious truth." Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. at 344.
Reliance on the prior rule, that the non-capital evaluations were not critical stages, should
be accorded little weight. Unlike establishing public policy in civil cases, Thompson v. Hagan,
criminal cases concern the application of constitutional protections and obtaining justice. There
is no interest in upholding unconstitutional sentences.
The impact of the retroactive application of Estrada is limited. Only those individuals
who participated in court-ordered psychosexual evaluations and were denied the opportunity to
seek advice from counsel or where counsel performed ineffectively would be entitled to seek
relief. The potential field of candidates for relief is further narrowed to those who filed a timely
application, that is, one filed within one year of the Estrada decision.
Even if the number of individuals for whom relief may be available is large, numbers
alone should not dictate whether the constitutional protection of the right to counsel will be
withheld from individuals. Such a bedrock principle of justice should not be swept aside because
of administrative inconvenience or burden.
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VI. Conclusion
Whether analyzed under Teague or the Whitman standards, the Estrada decision is one
that should be retroactively applied. In Mr. Vavold's case, his request for counsel was denied
and this depravation of counsel impacted his ultimate sente1tc .
1
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